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SPECIAL VERDICTS.
Speaking of civil cases, Blackstone says of the special verdict
"herein they [the jury] state the naked facts, as they find them
to be proved, and pray the advice of the court thereon; concluding conditionally that if, upon the whole matter the court should
be of opinion that the plaintiff had cause of action, they then
find for the plaintiff; if otherwise, then for the defendant."' He
speaks of another variety of the special verdict, "when the jury
find a verdict generally for the plaintiff, but subject nevertheless
to the opinion of the judge or the court above, on a shecial case
stated by the counsel on both sides with regard to a matter of
law." 2 Of the second form of special verdict Coulter J., remarks
that it "has gone out of practice, perhaps never existed in Pennsylvania. "'
REASONS

FOR.

A reason for a jury's preferring the special verdict was, that
such verdict was not subject to the writ of attaint, which might
result not merely in the setting aside of the verdict, but in the
punishment of the jurors.
There are however reasons which
both for the state as the patron of justice and for parties desiring
that justice shall be accomplished, render the special verdict preferable to the general. The general verdict is an affirmation not
simply that the facts are as alleged by the party in favor of whom
it is, but that the law, in virtue of these facts, entitles him to the
money or property claimed, if plaintiff, or to exemption from the

1 3 Comm. 377, 29 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
Pa. 31.
2 3 Comm. 378.
3
Wallingford v. Dunlap, 14 Pa. 31.
3 Blackstone, Comm. 377, 402.

1028;

Wallingford v. Dunlap, 14
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fiecessity of yielding up that money or property, if defendant.
Neither facts nor law is explicitly stated by the jury. The facts
necessary to be found, in the opinion of the court, in order to
justify the verdict, may not have been found to exist by the
jurors, but other facts which would not however warrant the decision. Or, although, the facts are found which under the court's
conception of the law would require a verdict for the plaintiff,
the jury may return a verdict for the defendant either perversely
or through a misconception of the law. In scme cases, the facts
are few and the applicable law susceptible of simple statement
and easy comprehension. A general verdict is then not inapapropriate. In other cases the evidence may be great in quantity,
contradictory, or of dubious significance; the number of facts
that must be deduced from it may be large. The law may be highly abstract and complex. In such cases, nothing can be more ludicrous to the judicious observer of law proceedings, than the effort
of a judge to make clear to blacksmiths, peasants, road-menders,
and mill hands, many points of law of which, until the trial, he has
himself though a lawyer of 30 years' experience, been ignorant,
and which, after hours of reflection he has apprehended with
dubious correctness, and all this in the apparent expectation that
these untrained persons shall successfully understand and apply
them to the facts when they have winnowed these out. If the
result surprises the judge, he cannot know whether it was from
error in the deduction of the facts or the interpretation of his
more or less [very frequently, less] lucid expositions of the law.
He must, unless he is willing to see an injustice done by the state's
instrument of justice, set the verdict aside, and take similar risks
of mistake in the next trial.
If the function of the jury is to ascertain the facts, and that
of ascertaining the law is the judge's, how absurd to waste public
time, and to flout the well known principle that what one mind
understands because long trained to a certain thinking, another
mind not thus trained cannot apprehend, in the effort to impart
to untrained jurors by a ten minute's lecture, what years of
preparation have enabled the judge painfully and obscurely to perceive. And, all to no purpose. If the law is and the court know
that it is that, on a certain state of facts, A will be entitled to
obtain $1,000 from B, surely all that the court needs from the
jury is the information whet],er these facts exist. The practice
of teachipg the jurors the law and allowing them to apply it,
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can be justified only by the desire of the judges to preserve their
popularity, or lessen their apparent responsibility, by making the
decision seem to come from the jurors, or from some tacit concession that the jurors after all, have a right independently to judge
the law, and are not bound by the instruction of the judge thereupon, or because the court is conceived to be a law school for the
teaching of law to those who have not passed the prelimiLary examination.
If the decision of the facts were kept free from intrication
with that of the law, the jury could commit error only in its derivation of the facts. The court would not need to commit itself
at the trial to legal principles about which it had not had time
or ability to inform itself, but could at its leizure investigate
them. It could enter judgment on the verdict without the necessity of stating the law at all, or, even if it did state the law inaccurately, the error would be harmless, if the law as conceived
by the appellate court required the same judgment upon the facts.
The advantage of the method of confining the jurors to their
declared function, ad quacstiones facti respondent juratores,
is sometimes recognized as a justification of the special verdict.
It enables the court suggests Sergeant J., "the better to determine the law of the case, on deliberate consultation." ' Mellon,
A. J., in a suit for damages against a railroad company for personal injuries, expressed to the jury the advantages of a special
over a general verdict, thus;' there is danger that the jury will
not be careful and unprejudiced; a vague idea of right or justice
may carry it away; especially in view of the wealth or power of
a railroad corporation. The finding of a special verdict will
obviate the necessity of special instruction as to the points of
law. Woodward, C. J., apparently endorsing these observations
ramarked "Negligence is generally a nixed question of law and
fact, and what renders special verdicts so proper in these railroad
cases, is that if they ascertain all the material facts, the undisputed as well as the disputed, the question of negligence then
becomes exclusively a question of law, and may be dealt with accordingly. This is a much better way of trying causes than to
leave to the jury the application of the law to the facts, for out
of this grows the practice of some judges of wholly committing
sChambers v. Davis, 3 Wh. 40.

GPittsburg etc., R. R. Co. v. Evans, 53 Pa. 250.

THE FORUM
the question of negligence to the jury."' In another case8 Sharswood, J., commends the special verdict, as being often very "convenient;" preventing "embarrassing question from arising on a
motion for a new trial, or on a writ of error, when it cannot otherwise be known on what grounds the verdict was rendered."
MAY THU COURT REQUIRP A SPECIAL VERDICT?

In 1837, Sergeant, J., expressed the opinion that the court
has no right to "direct" that is, to require, the jury to find a
special verdict, the jury being at all times at liberty to decide
for themselves whether they shall return a general or a special
verdict'
In 1882, the supreme court said "The court in no case
would be justified in directing the jury to find a special verdict.
A court may, in their discretion in a proper case, recommend a
special verdict, but it is a discretion this court will not review
and reverse if they refuse to exercise it."'" In this case, an action
for the carrying away of a schoolhouse, by a flood, the court refused the plaintiff's request to require the jury to find whether a
certain flood was extraordinary, how long the rain continued, the
number of cubic feet of water that passed, the proximate cause
of the carrying away of the school. In 1875, in an action of
trespass by a tenant for distraining goods when no rent was in
arrear, the court declined to answer points put by the defendant,
but "directed the jury to find a special verdict upon all the facts
in the case."
It reduced the questions of fact to writing, submitted the writing to counsel, and told them to add any others
the answer to which they might deem material. They suggested
no additions, and apparently made no objection to the court's
procedure. The court then directed the jury to specially answer
the questions, and find the plaintiff's damages. Says Mercur, J.
7

The special verdict found that there was no flagman at the crossing,
and that it was the defendant's duty to have a flagman there. Woodward,
C. J., captiously says, "out of this an inference of negligence might arise
for the jury to find-but they did not find it." He almost immediately
expresses preference for the ascertainment of the facts by the jury and for
the decision whether, they existing, the party was negligent, to be made by
the court. To find an omission to have a flagman, and of a duty to have
him, is not to find negligence!
8
Patterson v, Kuntz, 63 Pa. 246.
9
Chambers v. Davis, 3 Wh. 40. The court did not request a special
verdict, but in case the jury found a general verdict for the plaintiff, a
finding by them of a certain specified fact.
I°B. & 0. R. R. v. Sulphur Springs S. District, 3 Penny. 518.
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on the appeal of the defendant, "The court had the undoubted
right to direct the jury to return a special verdict. It is one of
the recognized modes by which the facts are put into the record.""
It is not error for a court to request a special verdict.2 Possibly,
should a jury refuse to obey the direction of the judge to return
a special verdict, and return a general one, it would be error of
which a party could complain, if the court refused to accept and
enter judgment on the general one," but it is scarcely credible
that if the jury obeyed, and the verdict covering all the necessary facts, judgment in accordance with it was entered, the appellate court would reverse, solely because of the court's requiring the special verdict. Apparently, in Crousillat v. Ball" the
jury, without suggestion from the court, after failing to agree
and reporting their failure to court, returned a special verdict.
The parties may agree that the jury may return a special verdict. 5
CASES IN WHICH SPECIAL VERDICT IS PERMISSIBLE.

There are cases where the evidence is so simple, free from
contradiction, so decisive, and where the law is so susceptible of
statement that shall be clear to and easily understood by a jury,
as to negate the propriety of suggesting or requesting a special
verdict, but the appropriateness of such a verdict is not confined
to any particular forms of action. It may be received in ejectments 6 in scire facias sur mechanics' lien" in assumpsit" in trespass 9 in all others.
"Fretton v. Karcher, 77 Pa. 423.
"Patterson v. Kountz 63 Pa. 246. The court is said to have directed a
special verdict in Sewing Machine Co.v. Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 645; Hartley v.
White, 94 Pa. 31, and the jury obeyed, apparently without error.
"3Devizes v. Clark, 3 Adol. & El. 5o6. The court accepted a general
verdict despite its having requested a special verdict. Cf. 29 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. xo28; Patterson v. Kountz, 63 Pa. 246.
'43 Y. 375.

"5Loew v. Stocker, 61 Pa. 347; McHale v. McDonnell,
Wallingford v. Dunlap, x4 Pa. 31.

175 Pa. 632;

' 8Thayer v. Society of United Brethren, 20 Pa. 6o; Appel v. Byers, 98
Pa. 479"Patterson v. Kountz, 63 Pa. 246.
"8Chambers v. Davis, 3 Wh. 4o; Coffin v. Fulton, 3 Brewst. 73; -Sewing
Machine Co. v. Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 645.
"9B. & 0. R. R. v. Sulphur Spring S. D., 8 Penny. 518; Fretton v.
Karcher, 77 Pa. 423; Kelchner v. Nanticoke Borough, 209 Pa. 412; Wallingford v. Dunlap, i4 Pa. 31; Pittsburg etc., R. R., v. Evans, 53 Pa.
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WHAT THE SPECIAL VERDICT MUST CONTAIN.

Certain facts must in every case exist, to entitle the plaintiff
to the money or property which he demands, or to countervail
the right which springs from these facts. The special verdict
must contain these facts, and not testimony concerning them, or
other facts from which they may or may not be derived. The
passing on the credibility of the testimony and its correct interpretation are the proper work of the jurors. They cannot devolve it upon the judge. So is the inferring the facts in issue,
from other facts having a probative value. Hence, the special
verdict must return, not the evidence, but the facts.' In Porter
v. Coleman,' Lewis, C. J. states that one of the judges of the
supreme court (Read, J.) was in favor of reversal because, instead of stating facts, the special verdict finds them to be "as
stated in the judge's notes of testimony." He says that the other
four judges thought the verdict not so far objectionable for that
reason as to require a reversal. It could be amended by the
notes of counsel or even by affidavit of what was proved at the
trial. A verdict for the plaintiff for $517 damages and six cents
costs, subject to the opinion of the court, but stating no facts upon which the court's opinion is to be based, will not sustain a
judgment. 2
MUST CONTAIN ALL THE PACTS.

The special verdict must contain all the facts necessary to a
recovery by the plaintiff. If two facts must be found, in addition to the amount of loss, in an action on a fire insurance
policy, a finding of the amount of the loss, and of one of these facts
will be insufficient to sustain a judgment for the plaintiff.'
In
an action on a policy of marine insurance, a finding that the captain of the ship did certain things, which might justify the inference that they increased the risk, without finding that they did
20Kingsley v. Coyle, 48 Pa. 461; Clark v. Halberstadt, i Miles 26; Union
Savings Bank v. Fife, ioi Pa. 388; McCormick v. Ins. Co. 163 Pa. 184..
In Herschberger v. Kachel, i Wood. 488, where there was no essential
controversy as to the facts, counsel agreed that the evidence should be
treated as a special verdict, and the court commended the agreement as
"judicious and well advised." They practically agreed that the facts should
be deenied to be those averred in the testimony.
2'1 Pittsb. 252.
22Roberts v. Hopkins, ii S. & R. 202.
"3Sewing Machine Co. v. Ins. Co.,

201

Pa, 645.
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increase it, would justify a judgment for the defendant."6 Facts
being stated from which the non-payment of a debt might be inferred, despite the lapse of twenty years since it became payable,
but the non payment inferred by the jury. not being stated, the
court cannot enter judgment for the plaintiff' though one of
these facts is the testimony of the defendant in an earlier trial
(before arbitrators) that he had not paid the debt. 6 In an action
against a borough for damages to the plaintiff from a fall caused
by a heap of ashes on a street, the court submitted certain questions in order that they should specifically answer then. None
inquired whether the defendant had been negligent. Judgment
on the verdict for the plaintiff was reversed because "these facts
might all have been found by the jury, and yet it would not follow necessarily that the borough authorities were negligent in
not discovering and removing the ashes between the time they
were transformed into a solid mound and the happening of the
accident."" In assumpsit by two as partners one of the defences was that the firm was composed of X in addition to these
two. If X was merely a dormant partner, his joinder in the
action was unnecessary. The court properly entered judgment
for the plaintiff because while the special verdict found that X
was a partner, it did not find that he was an active partner." In
an action for injury to plaintiff, in attempting to cross a railroad,
a special verdict finding that the defendant ought to have maintained but did not maintain, a flagman at the crossing, but not
finding that it was negligent therein, was insufficient to sustain
a judgment for the plaintiff." In an action on a fire policy, a
verdict which is silent as to the terms and conditions of the
policy, which does not state that any insured property was destroyed by the fire, is insufficient." In ejectment, the parties
2Crousillat v. Ball, 3 Y 375.
"Holmes v. Wallace, 46 Pa. 266; Diehl v. Ihrie, 3 Wh. 149; Kinsley v.
Coyle, 58 Pa. 461.
"6Kinsley v. Coyle, 58 Pa. 461. The jury must draw the inference that
the debt has not been paid, and express it in the verdict.
27Kelchner v. Nanticoke, 209 Pa. 412. But the verdict said that the
ashes had been in the street three weeks before the accident, and so long
"that the borough officially ought to have known it."
2eMorse v. Chas, 4 W. 456.
"Pittsburg etc., R. R. v. Evans, 53 Pa. 250. The verdict also omitted
to find that the plaintiff was a traveller necessarily upon the railroad at a
crossing.
3"McCormick v. Ins. Co. 163 Pa. 86.
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claiming under the same devise, being nephews of the testator
with similar names, the difference of the defendant's name from
that in the will not being found in the special verdict, a judgment for the plaintiff which this difference only would justify, is
erroneous.31
EXCUSES FOR OMITTING SOME OF THE FACTS.

Sundry palliations of the omission of essential facts from the
special verdict have been attempted, but in vain. Such verdict
is fatally bad, although counsel had agreed that the omitted fact
was a fact. It should be embodied in the verdict. 2 That the
facts have been undisputed is no excuse for omitting them33 nor
that they appear in the notes of evidence" or elsewhere in the
record" such as the judge's charge.3" Whatever is not in the verdict
must be treated as non-existent. 3 If facts are stated in the verdict, its want of a clear and methodical manner will not be fatal.35
CONTRADICTION IN TH.E VERDICT.

If concerning a necessary fact the verdict makes inconsistent averments, it will support no judgment for the party to whose
recovery the fact is necessary. If, e. g. in an action between
different claimants of the proceeds of a life insurance policy, viz.
$2000, one finding is that the policy had been assigned to one
of the parties as security for a loan of $700, and another is that
it was assigned absolutely, the verdict will not support a judgment for this party, for $1804.15, the debt of $700 with interest3
that is, apparently, the less favorable averment of the two even,
will not be taken as true.
31Appel v. Byers, 98 Pa. 479.
32Machine Co. v. Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 645.
33
Wallingford v. Dunlap, 14 Pa. 33; Craven v: Gearhart, i W. N. C.
Pittsburg etc., R. R. v. Evans, 53 Pa. 25o; Vansyckel v. Stewart,
126; Tuigg v. Treachy, 104 Pa. 498; Machine Co. v. Ins. Co., 2o Pa.

257;

77 Pa.
645.
4

. McCormick v. Ins. Co., 163 Pa. 194; Thayer v. Society of United
Brethren, 20 Pa. 6o.
35
Loew v. Stocker, 61 Pa. 347; Tuigg v. Treachy, 104 Pa. 493.
"6Craven v. Gearhart, i W. N. C. 257. Statements in the charge cannot
be taken as additional to, or in cohtradiction of those in the verdict.
3T
Appel v. 'Byers, 98 Pa. 479; Com. v. Grimes, 116 Pa. 450; Fenn v.
Blanchard, -2 Y, 54 3.
3Hartley v. White, 94 Pa. 31.
39McHale v. McDonnell, 175 Pa. 632.
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REMEDY FOR DEFECTIVE VERDICT.

If a jury of its own accord, or at the suggestion of the court,
returns a special verdict which does not embody all the facts
necessary for a judgment for the plaintiff, the proper course
doubtless is for the court to refuse to receive it, and require a
better one to be returned. If the verdict is in fact received, before its imperfection is discovered, it is said by Lewis, C. J. that
the trial court will supply the defect by amending it if possible,
by the notes of counsel, or even by affidavit of what was proved
at the trial" when the notes of testimony are referred to by the
"If," says .Sterrett C. J., "imverdict and made a part of it.
portant undisputed facts are omitted by mistake from the special
verdict, or are incorrectly recited lherein, the court may, upon
full proof thereof, so amend or mould the verdict as to make it
conform to the undisputed facts. This should be done when the
verdict is rendered, or as soon as practicable thereafter."" This
disposal of the matter can rarely be permissible. The trial court
should rather set aside the verdict and award a new tria4 2 or
enter a judgment for the party whose antagonist's case the verdict fails to support, ordinarily the defendant. If the trial court,
despite its imperfections enter judgment upon the verdict for the
plaintiff, when the facts necessary for his legal success are not
found, the appellate court will reverse, and ordinarily award a
venirefacias de novo. " The court may simply reverse when the
nature of the case, as developed below, convinces it that there
could be no recovery by the plaintiff. Possibly, if the trial court
enters judgment for the defendant upon a verdict which omits
some facts essential to a recovery, and the evidence would have
justified a finding of those facts, the appellate court will reverse
the judgment and award a venirefacias." The judgment having
4°Porter v. Coleman, i Pittsb. 25z. The parties, after notice of the
defect of the verdict with the assent of the court waived their objection to
it, and argued the case on the merits. Four of the five judges of the
Supreme Court thought it would be unjust to treat the verdict as void.
Reed J., though the verdict too defectiye to sustain a judgment. Upon the
merits two of the other judges were in favor of reversal. The judgment
was reversed nd a venire facias awarded.
4'McCormick v. Ins. Co., 163 Pa. 184.
2Clark v. Halberstadt, i Miles, 26.
Coffin v- Fulton, 3 Brewst. 73; Kincaid v. Schultz 40 Leg. Int. 329;
Stockerv. Loew, 61 Pa. 352, Porter v. Coleman, i Pittsb. 252.
14McCormick v. Ins. Co., 163 Pa. 184. The judgment for the defendant was reversed, with v. f. d. n.
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been for the plaintiff the supreme court may affirm it if the defendant's counsel agrees to the insertion of the omitted findings.
Otherwise it will reverse. 5 Whdn the verdict contains all the
facts necessary for a judgment for the plaintiff, a judgment for
the defendant will be reversed by the supreme court, which may
itself enter judgment for the plaintiff6 or remit the record with
direction to the court below to do so.47
SPECIAL. VERDICT ADDITIONAL TO GENERAL.

In his address before the Dickinson School of Law, at the
Commencement of 1894, Mr. Justice Williams of the Supreme
Court recommended that the trial court should request the jury,
in certain cases in addition to its general verdict to answer specifically, certain questions, not in order that these answers should
be treated as a verdict on which judgment was to be entered, but
to assist the jury in arriving at an intelligent general verdict, and
the trial court to know whether the general verdict was intelligently arrived at. This suggestion has been acted on in the
Lackawanna courts. 8 In one case, an action by a widow against
the city of Scranton, for the death of her husband who fell into
a cellar, there was a dispute whether the place of the accident was
reasonably safe, and whether the deceased, because he was intoxicated, fell into the cellar. The court submitted six questions to
the jury to be answered in addition to the general verdict. The
sixth requested the jury to state briefly how the accident happened if the deceased was not intoxicated. Negativing the drunkenness of the deceased, and affirming that the place was not
reasonably safe, the jury answered the sixth question by saying
that the death "was caused by the imperfect condition of the
sidewalk and guard and rail." For this evasiveness, this refusal
to say whether the dead husband of plaintiff had tripped on the
irregularities of the sidewalk, caused by the yielding of the boards
which formed it, the court made absolute a rule for a new trial. 9
In Connolly v. Shannon' Gunster, J. requested the jury to answer three questions, instructing them that if they answered the

'5Craven v. Gearhart, x W. N. C. 257.
4
6Com. v. Grimes, 1i6 Pa. 450.
47

This was done in a criminal case in Com. v. Chathams, 5o Pa. i8i.
48 Munley v. Scranton City, 4 Dist. 117; Connolly v. Shannon, 3 Lack.
L. N. 247; Van S torch v. Van Storch, 4 Lack. L. N. 25.
'9 Munley v. Scranton City, 4 Dist. 117.
50 3 Lack. L. N. 247.
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first two in favor of the defendant, they should find a general
verdict for him. They decided the first two questions for the defendant, failing to agree on the third. After reconvening, the
court instructed them to render a general verdict for the defendant. They did so. A new trial was refused. When there is no
inconsistency between the general verdict and the special findings,
the latter drop out, leaving the general verdict to operate.51
CRIMINAL CASES.

Says Blackstone" when speaking of the verdict of a jury in
criminal cases; "And such public or open verdict may be either
general, [guilty or not guilty] or special, setting forth all the
circumstances of the case and praying the judgment of the court,
whether, for instance, on the facts stated it be murder, manslaughter, or no crime at all. This is where they doubt the matter of law, and therefore choose to leave it to the determination
of the court; though they have an unquestionable right of determining upon all the circumstances and finding a general verdict,
if they think proper so to hazard a breach of their oaths, and if
their verdict be notoriously wrong they may be punished and
the verdict set aside by attaint at the suit of the king, but not at
the suit of the prisoner." A singular right is that, the exercise of
which exposes to punishment. And how an honest verdict, however much it rests on an erroneous apprehension of the law, can
be a breach of the juror's oaths, unless they have sworn to be
infallible, or have sworn in all cases in which they are not infallible, to return special verdicts, only the extraordinarily
shrewd may see.
The jury have a right in all criminal cases, capital or otherwise, to find a special verdict, by which the facts are put on the
record and the law is submitted to the judges.'
Very rarely
would the jury return a special verdict without suggestion or request of the court, The court may therefore suggest and advise
the special verdict. The consent of the defendant is unnecessary. 5
The taking of a special verdict in criminal cases, says Paxson,
J., "is rarely done, because a case seldom arises in which such a
course is useful or necessary. In the case in hand, we think
51

Van Storch v. Van Slorch, 4 Lack. L. N. 25. Archbald, J.
Comm. 365.
OCom. v. Chathams, 5o Pa. i81. Thompson J. dissenting, said that
there is no special verdict in criminal cases in Pennsylvania, unless by
consent of defendant.
524

246
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the learned judge below acted wisely in requesting the jury to
find the facts specially. They were altogether peculiar, if not
without precedent, and the case itself lies upon the border. The
right of the court to take a special verdict in criminal cases was
decided in Commonwealth v. Chathams, 50 Pa. 181, and the
same rule has been laid down in at least two recent cases not yet
The facts of the case were very simple. A, maker
reported." '
of a note for $1600, had it discounted by a bank. When it
matured, he carried to the bank a renewal note, deliberately
however making it for 16 dollars, in expectation that the bank,
not noticing the amount, would accept it, and surrender the first
note. The bank did accept it, and surrendered the first note,
not noticing that the amount was but 16 dollars. Whether A,
indicted for larceny had been guilty of larceny of the first note
on thus obtaining it from the bank was the legal question involved. It was evidently because the court needed time to investigate this question, that "the learned judge below acted
wisely" in Paxson, J's., opinion, in taking a special verdict, thus
gaining time for deliberation, a deliberation which nevertheless
resulted in a wrong decision, for the trial judge entered judgment on the verdict for the defendant.
FORM OF THE VERDICT.

After finding the facts, the jury in Com. v. Chathams" concluded "If upon the facts stated, the court should be of opinion
54

Com. v. Eichelberger, ii9 Pa. 254. "It is not error," says Livingston,
P. J., "for the court to frame and submit to the jury a special verdict and
advise its adoption, so long as there is no attempt to control the jury in its
action." In Com. v. Dixon, 5 Lanc. 398, a liquor case, Archbald J., prepared a special verdict and submitted it to the jury. Counsel objecting
that the court had framed the verdict, he said, "I venture to affirm that no
special verdict involving facts of any length was ever returned which court
or counsel had not framed for the jury. There is no attempt to control
their findings in this case. They are merely thereby given legal form and
direction. The court sits to administer justice and whatever conduces to
that end it may certainly advise, and. if need be, assist in."
' 5Com. v. Eichelberger, 119 Pa. 254. In Com. v. Chathams, 5o Pa. 181,
the case was one of larceny by bailee. The court made an elaborate investigation of bailment, but also reached a wrong conclusion, entering judgment for the defendant. The trial court was no more fortunate, in Com. v.
Zacharias, 3 Super. 264, 181 Pa. 116, where its judgment against the defendant for engaging in the business of druggist without registration, was
reversed.
5o Pa: 181.
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that the defendant is guilty as he stands indicted, then judgment
to be entered against him. If not guilty, then judgment to be
entered for the defendant." In view of this form, Reed, J., remarked, "It is sufficient if the jury find all the substantial requisites of the charge, without following the technical language
used in the indictment, and it does not seem necessary that the
jury, after stating the facts, should draw any legal conclusions."
In Com. v. Eichelberger 7 the jury, after stating the facts, concluded with words importing that if these facts "are sufficient in
the opinion of the court, to warrant a conviction of the defendant
of the crime of larceny, then the jury do say that le is guilty of
larceny in manner and form as he stands indicted. If not sufficient, then the jury find the defendant not guilty." In Com. v.
Zacharias' a general verdict of "guilty" was taken besides with
consent of counsel a finding of a series of specific facts. The refusal of a jury to comply with the request of counsel for a special
verdict, is no reason for a new trial. 9
THE NECESSARY EACTS OF THE DECISION.

All the substantial requisites of the crime charged, must be
found by the special verdict" when there is no general verdict.
If the court decides that these facts do not sustain the indictment
it enters judgment for the defendant, otherwise against him. If
the appellate court finds the defendant guilty, when the trial
court has found him not guilty, it may remit the record with instructions to the latter court to enter judgment for the commonwealth and to sentence the defendant."
If the trial court has
improperly decided the defendant to be guilty, the appellate
court reverses the sentehce6
7 1
ig Pa. 254.
In a liquor case a similar verdict was approved. Com.
v. Gerstley, 18 Lanc. 222. In Com. v. Shannon, x Pittsb. 261 it is said that
in a special verdict, the jury return that they are ignorant in point of law
on which side they ought to find, though the facts may be clear.
5 5 Dist. 475; 3 Super. 264; 181 Pa. r26.
59
Com. v. Shannon, x Pittsb. 260.
6Com. v. Chathams, 50 Pa. x8x.
6
1Com. v. Eichelberger, um
9 Pa. 254; Com. Chathams, 5o Pa. ,8i.
62
Com. v. Zacharias, 3 Super. 264. It is not necessary that with a general verdict of guilty, on an indictment for larceny, the jury should find
the value of the property stolen. Com. v, Butler. 144 Pa. 568.
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MOOT COURT
TOLLINS v. HINKLE.
Assignment of an Insurance Policy-Duty of Assignee to renew the
Policy-Consideration-Assumpsit Proper Action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Tollins mortgaged his house and lot to Hinkle for $4,000 and assigned
the policy of fire insurance on it. The policy expired in two years.
Hinkle had agreed to renew it, and to add the premium paid to the interest on the debt. Hinkle neglected to do so. The house was destroyed
by fire. The debt having been collected by Hinkle out of other property
which had been pledged for it, Tollins sues for damages, $3500.
Magrady for the Plaintiff.
The consideration for the promise was suffcient. Clark on Contracts,
p. 149; Hind v. Holdship, 2 Watt 104.
Harry for the Defendant.
No action will lie against one who has promised to insure. Thorn v.
Deas 4 Johns (N. Y.) 84, approved in New York Tartar Co. v. French
et al., 54 Pa. 273.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MAYO, J. :-The exact question in this case is will an action for
damages lie against the assignee of an insurance policy for his negligence
in failing to renew the policy when it appears that the policy was assigned as security for a mortgage debt and the assignee covenanted to
renew the policy but failed to do so and, the policy having run out and the
property having been destroyed, the mortgage debt was collected from
other property of the mortgagor.
The defendant relies on the case of Thorn vs. Deas, 4th Johns, (N.
Y.) 34 for the proposition that no action will lie against one who has
promised to insure but who has fdiled to do so and cites the Pennsylvania
case of N.Y. Tartar Co. vs. French, et al., 154 Pa. 273, as affirming this
doctrine. It is true that Thorn vs. Deas was considered in N. Y. Tartar
Co. vs. French and the doctrine affirmed in so far as it affected the case.
But the court found that there was a consideration for the promise to
insure, in that they had insured on former transactions whenever ordered
to do so, and therefore an order to insure was included in the offer to
buy and constituted part of the consideration for the sale. The court
said that since there was a consideration for the implied promise to insure, the doctrine of Thorn vs. Deas did not apply. The Court is of the
opinion that such is the case before us. The assignment of the policy,
then in force, was made for the mutual benefit of the mortgagor and the
mortgagee, and was made on the consideration of the promise to renew.
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The promise to renew was made in consideration of the assignment, and
certainly the assignment of the policy as a security for the debt was a
sufficient consideration to support the promise to renew.
It is a well established doctrine of the law of bailments that when a
security is pledged with the creditor for the security of his debt and
through his negligence the security becomes valueless and is lost to the
bailor, the bailor has an action against the bailee for the loss of the security, either in the nature of a set-off or in a separate action.
We are of the opinion that Hinkle is answerable in this action.
By the law of Pennsylvania a policy of insurance may be pledged as
security for a debt. By the general doctrine of bailments above expounded and by the law as laid down in N. Y. Tarter Co. vs. French,
supra, which holds that a promise to insure supported by a consideration
is binding, we think that Hinkle is clearly liable.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
When Tollins executed his mortgage to Hinkle, the consideration for
it was, in part, the loan of $4,000, and the promise of Hinkle to obtain an
insurance on the property, at his, Tollins' expense, and thus secure the
sufficiency of the premises to repay the debt. The promise then, had a
sufficient consideration. Towers vs. Grocers' Supply Co., 159 Pa. 106;
Boyce v. Permanent Loan Association 218 Pa. 494.
The house had been insured for $4,000, prior to this contract, and
Hinkle was to renew it, that is, to procure another policy, for the same
amount. The fire destroyed the house, and apparently reduced the value
of the premises from $4000 to $500. Had the lot been sold on the judgment sur mortgage it would have yielded but $500. The consequence has
been that Hinkle has obtained payment, to the extent of $3500 from other
property of Tollins. Tollins has lost $3500 by the omission of Hinkle to
renew the insurance.
The action is assumpsit. There was a contract and it has been broken.
Assumpsit is the appropriate remedy for the recovery of damages for a
breach of a contract. The contention that the action should have been
trespass for the tort, is sufficiently answered by Zeil v. Dunkle, 156 Pa.
353; Boyce vs. Association supra. Indeed the only tort in the case is the
tort that exists whenever a contract is not performed. A man is under
a legal duty to do that which he has agreed to do. The failure to do itis
a wrong. This failure may be due to inability, to forgetfulness, to malicious purpose. The reasons for Hinkle's failure do not appear. Assumpsit is clearly as appropriate as any other action could have been.
The important question of the measure of the damages suffered by
the non-performance of his contract, by Hinkle, has received scanty attention in the court below. That the loss from Hinkle's neglect might
easily amount to $3500 he was bound to anticipate. It was the reasonably probable effect. It was proper then, to allow the plaintiff to recover the amount of money which had the policy been taken out, would
probably have been recovered upon it. We do not assume that the insurance company would have refused to pay the policy, or that on account
of insolvency, it would bave been unable to pay it. The presumption is
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that the policy if any would have been paid.
entitled to a verdict and judgment for $3500.
Affirmed.

Hence the plaintiff was

liAMLIN v. White.
False Representation of Agency-Adoption by Alleged Principal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
One Abram Johnson had a valuable horse which he offered to Hamlin for $200. Hamlin asked Johnson to give him a week to consider it
and Johnson gratuitously promised to do so. Hamlin told White about
the horse and the offer and White advised him that the price was excessive. White then went to Johnson and falsely represented that Hamlin had sent him to buy the horse. He paid Johnson $200 and took the
horse on the fourth day after Johnson offered to Hamlin. On the sixth
day Hamlin went to buy the horse and learned the situation. He later
tendered White the $200 and demanded the horse; but White demanded
$300. Hamlin brings this action of replevin keeping ready his offer of

$200.
Kopyscianski for Plaintiff.
By adoption of White's act Hamlin became entitled to the horse and
could maintain replevin when White retained it. Huffcut's Agency 349.
Harrison for Defendant.
Ratification can only be effectual when the agent's act was in the
principal's behalf, not in his own. Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 1188.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
FUNK, J.-This is an action of replevin brought for the purpose of
obtaining possession of a horse which was held out for sale to the Plaintiff for $200 and with the offer a gratuitous option to reject or accept the
same within a week. Desiring the opinion of an expert, Plaintiff visited
the Defendant and stated the matters, receiving the advice not t5 purchase at the price named. Later Defendant asserted himself to the
owner as the Plaintiff's agent, and handing over $200 was given the horse;
the vendor resting in the sincere belief that he was selling to the Plaintiff and to no other. Plaintiff, before the optional period had elapsed,
went to the vendor and there learned the facts. He had gone with the
money and the intention to purchase. Desiring the animal he demands
it of the Defendant, and accompanies his demand with tender of the $200
which is kept open. Defendant refuses to deliver for less than $300, and
the suit is brought in consequence.
In disposing of this case, two main propositions must be discussed;
more or less in conjunction, however, owing to their nature and the facts
to which they relate. First, the nature of the action instituted, and
second, was there an agency created, and if so, was there a ratification
of such agency?
Replevin has to do preeminently with title; it is that which forms the
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basis and foundation of the action. One has possession, another has the
title. If no special property exists, the one holding the title has the right
to possession, and that being desired, he obtains it in suit in replevin.
Therefore it behooves us to see what title, if any, is in the Plaintiff.
We find that it was the intention on the part of the seller to pass
title to no one except the Plaintiff. Possesion was given up by the vendor
under the delusion thas he was selling to the Plaintiff, hence it is clear
that irrespective of the payment of the purchase price by the Defendant,
so far as title is concerned, none ever passed to White who held himself
out to be merely an intermediary in the whole transaction.
Eliminating therefore any discussion involving title in White, we
must locate it elsewhere, and two possibilities result. Either title never
passed from vendor, or it did and found its way to the Plaintiff.
This brings us to the second proposition. It has been argued, and
ably, that though White fraudulently held himself outas Plaintiff's agent,
yet there was sufficient ratification by the plaintiff of this act of socalled agency to make White's act his act, and that being so, the horse
was sold to him, and being sold with that intent, the title is in him, and
the agent so-called is estopped to deny the fact.
This is very ingenious, but it is not law. It were folly to deny that
one of the fundamental principles of agency is: that a principal may
ratify the unauthorized act of an agent, when he is fully acquainted with
the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the act. But we are at
a loss to see how this principle can reasonably be applied to the case in
hand. It is one thing to ratify an act of an agency that never existed,
but for that act, that is to ratify an agency; another to ratify an unauthorized act of an agent, and still another to ratify a fraudulent act,
which has as its basis the assertion of an agency, which never in fact existed, nor was desired by the one holding himself out to be the agent.
As to the two first situations, there is no doubt according to the decision
that a ratification may take place; but the last, which is the case in hand,
is an entirely different proposition.
The defendant holds himself out to be an agent, when in reality he
never for a moment becomes one, or desires so to be; his falsehood is
merely a means to an end for his own selfish gain. It is no more possible for one to ratify such an act and claim it one of agency, than any
other fraudulent act, and expect to reap gain from such condonation in
the Courts of Law. Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, page 1188.
Were this permitted, the law would be recognizing a condonation of
fraud and falsehood; condoning that, the life and existence of which does
more than any other one thing to vitiate and destroy commercial integrity. Just because a fraud is phrased in a certain fashion is no ground
for justifying the fraud, when the justification has nothing to rest upon
but the fashion.
We are therefore irresistibly brought to the following conclusions:That fraud was practiced upon the vendor and possession of the horse
obtained thereby, and any action against White could be maintained by
the owner (vendor) and by him alone. That no agency ever existed,
therefore no act of an agency could be ratified, and therefore no title ever
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passed to the plaintiff. His only remedy is to instigate the vendor into
an action against White, as clearly plaintiff would have no right under
the gratuitious option as against the vendor. Failing in this, he must
abide by the circumstances, a victim to misplaced confidence.
Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The plaintiff in replevin, must have a right to the possession of the
thing at the institution of the suit. Hamlin has no visible right to this
possession unless he is the owner of the horse. It avails him not that
White is not the owner, and has no right to the possession.
The horse belonged to Abram Johnson, who offered it to Hamlin for
$200, should Hamlin accept it within one week. Learning of this offer,
and thinking the price low, White resolved to get the horse by a trick.
Pretending to be the agent of Hamlin, he tendered the $200 and obtained
the horse. It is clear that up to this time, the horse has not become
White's or Hamlin's. There was no intention to sell it to White, and
there was no acceptance by Hamlin, of Johnson's offer. Later, and
within the week, Hamlin notified Johnson that he accepted the horse.
There had at this time, been no change in the purpose of Johnson that
Hamlin should have the horse, on his agreeing to pay $200. Since the
visit of White, he had supposed that Hamlin had already accepted it, and
he had delivered it to White for him. This purpose was not altered at
any time before he learned from Hamlin, that White had acted without
authority. Nor was it altered then. At no time has Johnson intended to
retract the offer. Not even now does he challenge the right of Hamlin
to the horse. The supposed transmutation of the offerinto a contractby
White's acceptance in the name of Hamlin, was not a retraction of it.
It still remained open, for the remainder of the week, to Hamlin's acceptance, and it was accepted.
The horse had already been delivered to White for Hamlin. A second delivery was unnecessary. The money $200 had been paid by White,
pretending to act for Hamlin, and was so accepted. Johnson had a right
to assume, and he did believe, that these acts had been done for Hamlin.
They did not need to be done again. We think that the elements of a
sale-contract here exist, and that the ownership of the horse passed from
Johnson to Hamlin.
It is not necessary to resort to a theory of a ratification of White's
act, in order to reach the conclusion that the horse is Hamlin's. Hamlin
has himself accepted the offer within the time. We do not think however, that we are precluded from discoveringsomething which if not ratification, operates much as does a ratification. White intervened pretending to be agent for Hamlin. He caused Johnson to think that he was
such agent and to deliver the horse to him for Hamlin. Why shall we
not say then, that his act can, if not ratified, be adopted by the latter?
Only by allowing an adoption, can the trick be wholly circumvented. If
we say, as does the learned court below, that Johnson has made no sale,
we deprive Hamlin of the benefit of his acceptance of Johnson's offer
within the week. He may or may not be willing to make a second offer
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of it at the same price. Scarcely any unsophisticated person in the world
would refuse to say, we opine, that when White by his trick, got the
horse that was intended for Hamlin, Hamlin ought to have the right to
take the horse, if he wants it.
It is true that Johnson might recover the horse from White, if he
wanted to, and if the horse has not become Hamlin's. But why should
he want to ? He was willing to sell the horse for $200, and he has received $200. It cannot matter to him, whether the money was White's
or Hamlin's, nor whether the horse is Hamlin's or White's. The consequence will be that if he retains the $200, and allows the horse to remain
with White, he will make the horse his, although the original transaction
had not wrought this transfer of ownership. White's fraudulent stratagem cannot be fully thwarted, except by allowing Hamlin to adopt his
act.
It may be suggested that the interest of Johnson ought also to be
consulted, in deciding whether the act of White may be ratified. But, it
is already settled that when A transacts business with C, who pretends
to be agent of B, and who intends his act to be for the benefit of B, he
will be bound by a subsequent ratification by B. What important difference, so far as A is concerned, is there between the representative act
of C, done without authority, but with the real intention to act for B,
and the same act done equally without authority, but without the real
intention to act for B?
If the word "ratification" has by usage acquired a sense which
makes its use inappropriate when the pretended agent does not really intend that his act shall be for the benefit of the supposititious principal,
then adoption or some other term will answer the purpose. The practical question is, should B have the right to claim the horse which A has
put into C's hands, with the intention that it should be B's, because C
has induced A to believe that he was receiving it for B, and to this question there can be but one proper answer. If B's appropriation of C's act
is not a ratification, it is at least an adoption.
The scholastic habit of mind has not been fully outgrown, even in
this modern epoch, and so distinguished a court as the court of errors of
New York has decided that under the circumstances of the case before
us there can be no ratification. Garvey v. Jervis, 46 N. Y. 310. It says
that the pretended agent must have not simply pretended to act for the
principal, but he must really have intended his act to be for the benefit
of the principal. Such decisions show how ready judges of a subtle turn
of mind, whose dialectic exceed their ethical interests, are, to sacrifice
justice to the love of logical distinctions.
We are of opinion that the horse became the property of the plaintiff by either of two methods: (a) The offer of Johnson continued open,
the owner conthat is, his disclosed intention to allow Hamlin to become
tinued until within the week, Hamlin signified his intention to accept
the horse. (b) White's act represented by him to be for and being consequently believed by Johnson to be for, Hamlin, has been adopted by Hamlin, whatever White's secret intention was. By this adoption the horse
became his.
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The price of the horse has been paid by White. That circumstance
presents no difficulty. When Hamlin adopts his act, he may probably be
compelled to pay the $200 to White. But since White paid the money in
an attempt to perpetrate a fraud upon Hamlin, he would not be treated
too harshly, if he were deprived altogether of the money which he expended with the nefarious design.
Reversed with v. f. d. n.

AflO5 DOOLITTLE vs. T-OnIAS TARPIN.
Covenants which run with the land.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Frees let his farm to Tarpin for two years Tarpin agreeing
when he gave up the premises to sell to Frees any hay that might be undisposed of by Tarpin at the then current price. Three months after
making the lease Frees sold the farm to Doolittle to whom Tarpin has
paid the rent as it has accrued. When Tarpin left at the end of the term
he carried away twenty tons of hhy valued at four hundred dollars. Action of assumpsit on the contract.
Bigelow for the Plaintiff:
For the breach of a covenant running with the land the owner for the
time being is the proper person to sue. Kaur v. Sawyer, 14 John, N. Y.
89.
Cooke for the Defendant;
In order that a covenant may run with the land its performance or
non-performance must effect the nature, quality or value of the property
demised independent of collateral circumstances, or must affect the mode
of enjoyment. Brolosky vs. Hood, 6 Phil. 193; Norman vs. Wells, 17
Wend. 136..
OPINION OF THE COURT.
FORSYTH, J. -Thomas Tarpin agreed to sell to John Frees any hay
which might be on the farm when his term expired. Was this a covenant
and if so, was it such that the lessor's grantee could enforce it against
the tenant? The covenant must be such that it may run with the land if
the plaintiff can enforce it. In order that a covenant may run with the
land its performance or non-performance must affect the nature, quality,
or value of the property demised, independent of collateral circumstances,
or must affect the mode of enjoyment, Norman vs. Wells, 17 Wend. 136;
Brolosky vs. Hood, 6 Phila. 193. We think this covenant does not run with
the land. If it appeared that the lessor wished to have this hay to convert
into manure, or for some benefit to the land, then the plaintiff could have
recovered. Donmon vs. Moore, 1 Chest. Co. 65: Sharpless vs. Murphy, 7
Del. Co. 22; Young vs. Walters, 5 Pa. C. C. 127. However we think this
was a personal covenant and the plaintiff cannot recover.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Did the obligation of Tarpin's covenant to sell the hay that might be
on the premises at the end of the term, pass to the vendee of the reversion?
The vendee of the reversion, is, as such, interested only in contracts
which .vere designed to affect the land, to modify it, to increase its value,
to facilitate the cultivation or the other uses of it. Hay is a commodity,
having after severance no necessary relation to the land on which it grew
or to any other land. Some particular hay may however, be destined for use
on the premises with a view to their fertilization. Had i~t appeared that
the object of the parties, as disclosed to each other, had been to effect
this local benefit, the conclusion would have been justified that the performance of the covenant being intended to profit the land, the right to
that performance Would pass to the person to whom the land itself should
pass. "Whether" said an able court, "a covenant will or will not run
with the land does not so much depend on whether it is to be performed
on the land itself as on whether it tends directly or necessarily to enhance its value or render it more beneficial or convenient to those by
whom it is owned or occupied." Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ill. 199. A covenant to insure, when the money realized in case of loss is to be expended
in rebuilding or repair, will run with the land. Masury v. Southworth,
9 Ohio St. 341. In Chapman v. Smith, 2 Ch. 97 (cited in Columbia Law
Review, Vol. VII, p. 627,) the lessee, having covenanted to sell his hay to
the lessor at the end of the term, the grantee of the reversion of the
lessor obtained an injunction against the removal of the hay by the tenant at the expiration of the lease.
Judgment affirmed.

MARY THORPE vs. TROLLEY COMPANY.
Contributory Negligence-Case of a Child of Tender Years.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Mary Thorpe, a widow, engaged in washing, sent her son six and
three-fourths years old to a store to buy some soap, soda, etc. The store
was on the opposite side of the street which was traversed by the defendants cars, and many vehicles. The child was run over in consequence of
the negligence of the motorman and killed. The only defense the defendant had was that the plaintiff's act in sending the child across the
street was negligence. The plaintiff offered evidence of the wisdom,
care, and self-control of the child in order to justify her act. The court
excluded it. Verdict for the defendant..
Motion for a new trial.
Branch for plaintiff: Contributory negligence by parents in cases as
to children of five and upwards is a question of fact for the jury.
Mulligan vs. Curtis, 100 Mass. 512; R. R. Co. v. Pearson, 72 Pa. 169.
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Butler for defendant: To allow small children upon a public highway is
criminal negiigence.
21 Wend, (N. Y.) 615; 95 Pa. 398.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KURTZ, J.-The only question to be determined, is whether the act
of the parent under the circumstances of this case in sending her son six
and three-fourths years old across the street traversed by an electric car
and many vehicles, is negligence per se.
The ruling of the court in refusing to allow evidence of the wisdom,
care and self control of the child, in order to justify the parent's act was in
effect to hold that age and not capacity to appreciate danger and the ability
to avoid the same, was the standard by which a parent in the care of its
child shall be measured; that the mere fact that a child of tender years
is found in a public highway is such negligence on the part of the parents
as will bar recovery in an action by the parents to recover for the death
of a child caused by the negligence and carelessness of those traversing
the street. This however is not the rule and the sufficiency of care on
the part of the parent is a question for the jury. 31 W. N. C., 472.
Whether a boy six and one-half years of age in crossing a street car
track on an errand to a drug store has capacity to appreciate the danger
and avoid it, is a question for the jury. The Lombard and South Street
Passenger Railway Company vs. Steinhart, 2 Pennypacker, 358; nor is it
contributory negligence per se on the part of a parent for a child of tender years to be on the public streets unattended. Reinike vs. Traction
Co., 2 Pa. District Rep. 319.
"The rule that a child under fourteen years of age is not presumed
to have either judgment or discretion is not recognized on the civil side
of the court." 2 Northampton Co. Court Rep. 117. The court by the
above statement recognized the intelligence of a child, his capacity to
appreciate danger and his ability to avoid the same, and not mere age as
the measure of negligence, when the question shall arise as to the negligence of a parent in allowing her child of tender years to cross a busy
street. We must take into consideration that this child was living in the
city, probably born and raised there, and was accustomed to the running
of cars and the drawing of wagons. A child seven years old so situated
might have, and probably would have, as much cunning, and be as appreciative of such danger as another fifteen years of age and not so situated.
Being accustoined to such a life, the parent should have a right to show
the intelligence and capacity of 'the child. Had this child been from the
country, never having seen an electric car before, and not acquainted
with the traffic of a busy street a different rule might apply. Such however is not the case in hand.
But there is still another side to this case. The plaintiff was a poor
widow supporting herself and children by the toil of her own hands. To
hold that she had not the right to send her intelligent son and one appreciative of-danger across the street, would be a cold, harsh and revolting rule.
Such a rule'wouldbeirrational. Wisdom is not synonymous with age. This
widow was hot able to have servants at her side to wait upon her nor to
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care for her children while out of the house, as may be the lot of some
of her more fortunate neighbors, but she did have the right to the services of her children. Should the law discourage such noble motives as
prompted this woman to hold together her family, and thus bestow upon
her children the wholesome influence of a mother's love?
In P. R. R. vs. Brooks, 2 Walker 122, it was held that it was not
necessarily negligent for parents to allow their seven years' old daughter
to cross the railroad track alone in going to school. The question whether
the child was negligent was a question for the jury.' The court held in
Hestonville Passenger Railway Co. vs. Connell, 88 Pa. 520, that a child
six years and nine months old, one old enongh to run at large, had sufficient discretion to avoid ordinary danger. Surely a normal child (and it
is not contended that this one was otherwise) six and three-fourth years
of age is able to run at large. To such a child born and bred in the city
the traffic of a busy street is not more than ordinary danger.
The court will admit that to suffer a child incapable of discerning
danger to cross a street traversed by many vehicles and electric cars, is
negligence per se and as such would bar recovery in an action by the parent. This is the assertion of a principle. But whether a child six and
three-fourths years of age lacks such discretion and appreciation of danger and ability to avoid it is a matter of fact and is a subject of evidence.
This is a fact for the jury.
Reason and authority demand that evidence of the wisdom, care and
self control of the child, should have been admitted.
New trial granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
That the defendant was not improperly found by the jury to have
been guilty of negligence is not seriously disputed. The defense consists in the alleged negligence of the plaintiff. The child of Mary Thorpe
is not the plaintiff. Although he should be held incapable of being negligent, and for that reason had he survived entitled to recover damages
for the injury of himself, it would not follow that his mother, the plaintiff, was not negligent, in sending him across the street.
A child under seven years of age, it is said, is conclusively presumed
to be incapable of negligence. Wcelckner v. Erie Moter Co., 176 Pa, 451;
Parker v. St. Railway Co. 207 Pa. 438; Phila. etc. R. R. Co. v. Layer,
112 Pa. 414; Sullenberger v. Chester Traction Co., 33 Super, 12. An incapacity for negligence might result from the perfection of the attention,
memory, experience, of a person. Negligence involves the absence of
full apprehension of the facts and of a proper selection of acts made desirable in view of them, or of a certain responsiveness of the corporeal
movements. A perfect mind, perfectly controlling a perfect body, would
then be incapable of negligence.
But it seems that what is improperly called negligence is equally impossible when the absence of these qualities is most marked and complete.
Certain human beings, because of their so-called insanity, or immaturity,
are dispensed from the duty of being attent, observant, wise in the
adoption of ends and means, and because of this exemption, they hre said
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to be incapable of negligence. But, when negligence is thus denied to
them, all that is meant is that responsibility for acts or omissions for
which the adult or the sane would be responsible, does not exist. It seems
to be supposed that the adult might, and therefore ought, to be attentive
to his situations, might and therefore ought, to adopt acts and expedients
which would avert harm to others or to himself, etc. The young child is
conceded to be unable, and therefore unobliged to be observant, to know,
to act wisely, etc. When a child is not over seven years old the judges
think that they know that he is thus unable. They think they know
him to be thusunable, when they know nothing of him save that he is not
more than seven years old. Nay, they refuse to hear anything further
about him, in order to convince themselves that he is able, or, hearing
something more about him, they resolve in advance and peremptorily,
that they will not be convinced by it. The child of not more than seven
years, therefore is not responsible for negligence, because it cannot watch,
see, hear, infer, as do older persons, nor sufficiently to make it responsible for not seeing, hearing, and inferring.
Does it follow from the judge's knowing that the child under seven
years, cannot attend to objects about him, cannot know their relations as
cause and effect, cannot adopt wise expedients for avoiding injuries, that
the child's parent has the same knowledge? Must he be conclusively presumed to know the incapacities for care of the child? He must, if we are
to accept uncritically, an occasional decision. In Sullenberger v. Chester
Traction Co., 33 Super, 12, the parent was held incapable of recovering
for injuries to his less than seven years old child whom he had sent across
a street, and who in crossing, had been run into by a car. The logic of
the court is, the child was less than seven years old; such a child is, ipso
facto is, incapable of care, Therefore it is a want of care, it is contributory
negligence in the parent, to send the child into the street. But, this conclusion is a patent non sequitur, unless we assume that the child under
seven being incapable of care, the parent knows that it is thus incapable
or would have known it, had he not been negligent in his observations of
the child.
. The parent may know more about the capacity of his own particular
child than the sage jurists know of children in general. John Stuart
Mill studied Greek, mathematics and other recondite matters at four, and
his father doubtless knew that John could be trusted to go across the
street without running into an omnibus. The begowned and bewigged
justice perched on the bench, would have conceded that he knew better,
and had James Mill, knowing the general capacity of John, sent him
across the street and had John disappointing him by an unexpectable act
of rashness brought injury upon himself, the justice would possibly
have turned the father out of court with the maxim, a child under seven
cannot be prudent. That we know and you ought to have known it too.
Hence, you shall have no redress.
The offer in the trial court was to show the "wisdom, care and selfcontrol of the child". The judge, instructed by his superiors, was so
wise that he knew, without evidence, that the child would not, and therefore did not have wisdom, care and self-control. He spurned the evidence, and virtually told the jury that the parent had no right to make
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his own inferences as to the trustworthiness of his boy. He must be
governed by the opinion which great jurists have formed on the subject,
and not to know and believe and act upon their opinion, is on his part a
negligence which will prevent his obtaining indemnity for the killing of
his child.
But, even if the parent was bound to know that every child under seven
years, is incapable of taking care of himself in crossing a street, it would
not follow that the mere dispatch of the child across the street was negligence. The risks in crossing a street may be more or less, according to
the population, business, and habits of the people of the place; and the
length of time the child is to be on the street, and the greatness of the porportion of it which he has to traverse. It must also be remembered that
all life consists in the assumption of risks, and the wisest man must consciously incur some of them almost daily, or life would stop stock-still. The
plaintiff below was a poor woman, engAged in washing. She had no servant. It was useful to the boy to habituate him to the performance of
small duties. The exiguousness of her own means compelled her to rely
upon him for services which she could secure from no one else. It is easy
for persons who live without manual toil, who receive good salaries, who
fare sumptuously and enjoy at every turn, the ministrations of lackeys,
to read a lecture to this poor woman for having made a servant of her
boy, and exposed him as they would never need to expose theirs, to the
dangers of the street. It is easy to turn her away without redress on the
pretext that though the defendant was unquestionably negligent in killing
her boys it would not have killed him, if she had not sent him upon his
little errand. We think the principles laid down in the second trial of the
case correct, and that it was for the jury to say whether the circumstances warranted the plaintiff in sending her son into the street for the
purpose for which he was sent.
Affirmed.
JOHN WEBSTER vs. SAMUEL WEBSTER and SAMUEL WEBSTER
EXECUTOR OF HENRY WEBSTER, DECEASED.
Right of Child to bring action against Parent for injuries Inflicted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Webster, an infant, was brutally beaten by his drunken father,
Henry Webster, without provocation, and severely injured. One year
later Henry died, having devised all his property to a brother, Samuel, whom
he named executor. John, the son, brings this action of trespass for
$5000 damages, against Samuel, in his own name and as executor of
Henry. John is now twenty-one years old.
Hess for the Plaintiff.
Such an action will lie. Cooley on Torts, second Ed. p. 171.
Grover for the Defendant.
An infant'has no right of action against a parent for injuries. MeKelvey v. McKelvey, 64 L, R, A, 991.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
MISS BRACKEN, J.-On principle, there appears to be no reason
why a minor child should not have a right to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of a parent. The right of a parent to correct his minor child is understood, it being one of the first rules in our
domestic relations. But it is equally true, that if he exercises this authority with cruelty, he may subject himself to criminal punishment.
The child has rights which the law will protect.
There is, however, some authority for the proposition that the parent
may be sued in a tort action by the injured child (Reeves on Domestic
relations, 4th Ed. P. 357): and Parsons, J. in Com. v. Seed, 5 Clark, 78;
says, "where it appears that the parent acted malo animo, from wicked
motives, under the influence of an unsocial heart, he ought to be liable
for damages."
But the better view seems to be "That the peace of society, and of
the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to
subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society," forbid
to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a
claim to civil redress for such injury.
The plaintiff, therefore, not having such action against his father for
civil redress, certainly cannot recover from his father's executor.
We think, however, the plaintiff erred in bringing this action against
Samuel Webster, in his own name, and as executor of his father Henry
Webster. Even had he found that such action would lie against the
father and by the act of 1895, P. L. 236, would survive against the fathers executor, yet, under no circumstances, would Samuel Webster be
personally liable for injuries inflicted on the plaintiff, by his drunken
father, Henry Webster.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Henry Webster, while drunk, brutally beat and severely injured his
son, without any provocation, The question is had he a legal right thus to
beat the boy.
The law declares the wrongness of an act by giving a remedy in
damages, to the person who suffers it; or by punishing it in the name of
the state. It is needless to observe, that Henry Webster's act was an
assault and battery for which he would have been criminally responsible.
Parental right to castigate the child presupposes a fit occasion, a good
motive, and the observance of due limits to the punishment. Here there
was no provocation, no act of the child requiring punishment. The flogging was "brutal". It resulted in severe injury.
But, when one man commits an assault and battery on another, he is
liable to the other, civilly, for the wrong. If Henry Webster is not liable to John, his son, his exemption springs solely from the relation. John
was a child, his own child. He was rendered unable to defend himself
by his undeveloped physical state, and by the spirit of deference and submission which is instilled into all children, by their teachers secular and
spiritual. That Henry abused his opportunity to injure his son, makes
his act far more reprehensible than it would have been if directed against
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a stranger. Why then should the son not have the same redress that
any other person would have had?
Is it because it is impious for a son to seek redress from a father?
Surely not. The son can complain before a magistrate, of the battery
upon him; can thus cause the arrest of his father; can at the trial testify
against him; can, on his own uncorroborated evidence, cause him to be
heavily fined and long incarcerated. If all this is not a profanation of
the holy relation between son and father, how much less would a civil
suit be, which was not prompted by a vindictive sentiment, as a criminal
prosecution would be, but by a desire for compensation for the injury actually suffered?
The cases are very few in which a child has brought a tort action
against his parent, and the possible attitude of many courts to the question of his right to do so, is for that reason not knowable. Cooley avers
that "In principle there seems to be no reason why such an action should
not be sustained." Torts, p 197, 2nd ed., but he strangely adds that the
"policy" of inviting the child to contest the parent's authority is so questionable that "we may well doubt if the right will ever be sanctioned";
a queer conclusion to reach, if in "principle" there is "no reason" why
the action should not be allowed. We had supposed that it was a "principle" to allow no action which contravened a sound policy.
But, does not the child contest the parent's right to break his arm,
or leg, or back, to gouge out his eye, when he causes him to be criminally
convicted? Has not the State itself denied to the parent the right to
maim his child, and accepted the co-operation of the child in punishing
him for it?
In McKelvey v, McKelvey, (Tenn.) 64 L. R. A. 991, the right of a
child to sue a step-mother was denied. The only reason given is one
quoted from Hewellette v. George (Miss.) 9 South. Rep. 885, "The peace
of Society and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of
society forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands
of the parent." The State, the judge proceeds to say, "through its
criminal laws will give the minor children protection from parental violence and wrong doing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand."
The child in short, can cause his father to be thrown into jail, and thus
promote the peace of families, and the repose of society, but if he were
granted civil redress this peace, this repose, would be subverted! So wise
and profound are those who make laws for us.
When a father maims a child, blinds it, diminishes its power to care
for itself, and realize its happiness, the least that he should expect to do,
would be, to make what reparation he can out of his own property. If
he will not do it, voluntarily, the State ought to coerce him to do it. But
it is said that the parent must have the right to correct and chastise the
child, and that he would be intimidated from exercising this right, could
he be sued for the exercise of it. But have the courts proceeded on the
principle that because the right of suit might be abused, there shall be
no right of suit? B may falsely allege that A has made a contract with
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him, or that A has broken the contract. Therefore, allow no contract
actions? B may falsely allege that a certain act of A's was done with
malice or negligence. Therefore, give no tort actions! If the possibility
of the abuse of the right to sue is a good reason for a general denial of
it, what are courts for? The simple-minded citizen thinks that they can
distinguish the bad cases from the good, that they will defeat the plaintiff whose cause is bad, and put the costs on him; and that this will be
the only deterrent to unfounded suits that it is necessary to provide. He
would think the proposition to entertain no suits at all, because some of
them, if entertained, would be causeless, a singular one to emanate from
courts whose sole raison d'etre is that they do justice by entertaining
suits that must be entertained, if justice is to be done, and by dismissing
suits that must be dismissed, when justice so dictates.
If youths brought baseless suits through their next friends, these
would soon learn that it was unprofitable to lend their names to them.
There would be the same dissuasive against unfounded litigation of this
class, as against that of any other class.
It is said that the parent would be afraid to exercise his just and
necessary authority, if his conduct could be investigated in court. The
teacher's authority can thus be investigated and no one complains that for
this reason, it is too much weakened. But when it is investigated, a
competent court will vindicate him if he acted within his right. The
judge is ordinarily a parent, more than half the jurors are ordinarily parents. The defendant parent would not need to fear that his triers would
be prejudiced against the just exercise of parental authority.
But, if there must be no suits by children, so that parents may not
be dissuaded from, a proper exercise of castigatory power, is not liability
to suit necessary in order to restrain them from an abuse of it? If public policy requires that they should not be frightened from doing as much
as they should towards chastising their children, is there no policy that
requires that they should be frightened from a gross excess? Conferring
irresponsibility on parents for abuses of their children would tend to
promote such abuses, if making them responsible would tend to reduce
their regimen below the proper line of strictness. We are entirely without
experience to warrant the suspicion that were parents suable by children
they would be exposed to unfounded suits. On the contrary we remember at this writing not a single case in the long history of English jurisprudence, in which a child has sued a parent for this cause. It is vain to
suggest that the explanation of this fact is the consciousness of the lawyers that no such suit could be entertained. There could be no such consciousness, in the absence of prohibitory decision or legislation.
Those who have made our laws have from time immemorial been at
times terrified by, bugaboos of various sorts. If married women could
contract, or even control their own property; if parties could testify for
each other; if the ordinary man could criticise in print the doings of the
government, if he had a voice in the selection of his governors, or in the
determination of their policies, our wise predecessors were sure that dire
results would overtake society. But a less conservative age has given
to married women almost all the legal powers of men; has allowed par-
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ties to testify, has made criticism of the government a right, and has
extended to large numbers of plain people a participation in it, and the
evils which our fore-runners expected to follow, have not been realized.
We may take courage from this experience and believe that if brutal parents were liable to compensate their children out of their estates the
domestic bond would not be severed: children would not rush pell-mell
into court to sue their fathers on every inadequate pretext, parents would
not be scared into throwing the reins upon the necks of their children,
and society would not dash headlong into chaos.
A few cases have held that a wife cannot sue a husband for tort,
and it is supposed that the reason is the same, in the case of suit by child
against a parent. But, in Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B.D. 436, the reason assigned for denying to the wife an action against the husband is their
unity. A man cannot commit an assault on himself;- therefore he cannot
commit an assault on his wife, for she is he. A woman cannot sue herself. Butwhen she sues her husband she sues herself. Said Field J., the
"real, substantial ground [how very substantial it indeed is!] why the
wife cannot sue her husband is not merely a difficulty in the procedure, but
the general principle of the common law that husband and wife are one
person."
Blackburn, J., said that the dificulty in the way of such a suit
was, "not the technical one of parties, but because, being one person,
one cannot sue the other"
It is unnecessary to suggest that thoughthe
judges knew how to compound a man and his wife so, that she became
he, they did not learn how to compound him and his children, so that
they became he.
We are not to forget that Henry Webster is dead. The suit is
against his executor. His parental control is over. He cannot be scared
into renouncing it by a suit, for he has already renounced it. The practical question before the court is, shall his whole estate pass to his brother
Samuel, although, had John been some one other than a son, he would
have been entitled to a large part of it as compensation for a flagitious
abuse of power. The domestic relation is ended. Why then should the
suit not be allowed? Are we to say that if parents know that their executors may be sued by their children, for their assaults and batteries,
they will be afraid to exert a proper governance over their boys! Imbecile!
It must be conceded that in a case of suit by a wife for the husband's tort after the termination of the marital relation by divorce,
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304; it was held that the disability to sue continued. There was it was said no right of action prior to death, and
therefore death could not create it. But our law is familiar with rights
to sue which came into existence at the close of the coverture, though
the cause of them is an act done before its close. A woman may testify
against the administrator of her husband, she may sue the administrator
of her husband, though she could not testify against, nor sue, him.
There might conceivably be reason to refuse to entertain a suit by a child
against a parent, which would not require rejection of his suit against
the parent's executor. In Howellette v. George, 9 South. Rep. 885,
a daughter sued her mother, but the mother died pending the action, and
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her administrator was substituted as defendant. She was not allowed
to recover, but the court does not advert to any difference between a
suit against a living parent and a suit against his executor.
A realization of the case before the court ought to bring with it, the
answer to the question whether the suit should be entertained. The
father brutally maltreated his son, reducing his power to provide for
himself to an extent that may be measured by let us say $5,000. This
father has died, and has given all his estate to the boy's uncle. Equity,
justice sternly demands that the boy shall obtain compensation. To deny
it to him, can be justified by no reasons that can prevail with sensible
men. There is not even the argument from a long line of precedents.
The only objection vouchsafed is, that if such suits were allowed, boys
generally, when chastised, would resort to them. But, if they did, they
would in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred be defeated, unless the
courts are composed of simpletons, and boys, or their procheins amis
would soon learn, as do other suitors that they must have a good ground
to sue, in order to succeed. Nor is the ordinary parent going to cower before his boys, because he may be sued by them, any more than the ordiinary policeman is going to flee before the law-breaker, lest, attempting
to arrest him, he be sued for assault, or than the sheriff is going to refuse to levy an execution because some one other than the defendant may
claim the goods. Parents generally are not cowards nor nincompoops,
and judges are sorely mistaken if they think them such. They will still
be masters in their own homes, even if the courts compel such of them
as brutally abuse their privileges to atone in damages, for the wrongs to
their children that they may have done.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

